Closed-loop supply chain models with coopetition options
研究了原始设备制造商与社会回收商在电子回收中的竞合博弈，发现社会回收商对竞合或竞争无偏好，而原始设备制造商严格偏好竞合。
This paper proposes a Closed-loop Supply Chain game-theoretic model that mimics the DellReconnect Supply Chain. Within this framework, we characterise a game between an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and a social collector, who work together to recover electronics. The market comprises three segments: consumers purchasing only new goods, consumers purchasing only used goods, and indifferent consumers. The social collector decides whether the returns will be used to serve the used-market segment or the indifferent market segment first, thereby establishing the market structure and deciding whether to opt for competition or coopetition. We find that, whereas the social collector is indifferent when it comes to a choice between coopetition and competition, the OEM strictly prefers coopetition.