A Theory of Monetary Union and Financial Integration
构建理论模型,分析汇率制度如何影响金融一体化:固定汇率(如货币联盟)消除货币风险,促进跨境资本流动,但可能引发多重均衡和低效资本外逃,需要国际合作实施资本管制或财政转移来消除不良均衡。
Abstract Since the creation of the euro, capital flows among member countries have been large and volatile. Motivated by this fact, I provide a theory connecting the exchange rate regime to financial integration. The key feature of the model is that monetary policy affects the value of collateral that creditors seize upon default. Under flexible exchange rates, national governments can expropriate foreign creditors by depreciating the exchange rate, which induces investors to impose tight constraints on international borrowing. Creating a monetary union, by eliminating this source of currency risk, increases financial integration among member countries. This process, however, does not necessarily lead to higher welfare. The reason is that a high degree of capital mobility can generate multiple equilibria, with bad equilibria characterized by inefficient capital flights. Capital controls or fiscal transfers can eliminate bad equilibria, but their implementation requires international cooperation.