Political elections and corporate investment: International evidence
研究发现政治选举期间企业投资会减少，但实行相对多数选举制的国家中企业投资减少幅度较小；跨国公司在东道国选举期间也会减少投资，但若东道国采用相对多数制则影响更弱。
Abstract Recent literature shows that the spike in uncertainty during political elections harms firms’ investment. Bridging insights from international business and political science, we argue that the effect of political elections on firms’ investment activities is contingent on the country’s electoral system. In particular, we expect the negative effect of elections on corporate investment to be smaller for firms operating in plurality systems. We test our theory using a panel dataset of listed firms around the world, and a panel of US multinationals. Our results confirm that during an election period, firms in countries with a plurality system reduce investment less than firms in other countries. Additionally, we show that multinationals’ foreign investment is affected by elections abroad: their investment in a host country declines during an election in that country, though to a lesser extent if the election is held with a plurality system. Collectively, our findings provide new evidence on the role of political institutions for firms’ investment decisions.