Dynamic Incentives in Retirement Earnings-Replacement Benefits
研究了养老金制度中基于最后几年收入计算福利所产生的动态激励，利用乌拉圭数据发现自雇者和部分小企业员工通过提高报告收入来增加福利，导致养老金成本上升约GDP的0.2%。
Abstract We analyze dynamic incentives in pension systems created by the use of a small set of final years of earnings to compute benefits. Using social security records and household surveys from Uruguay, we show that self-employed workers and some employees of small firms respond to these incentives by increasing reported earnings in the benefit calculation window. We find evidence that suggests that these responses are explained by changes in earnings reporting and not in total earnings or labor supply. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that this behavior increases the cost of pensions by about 0.2% of the GDP.