Do Director Networks Help Managers Forecast Better?
研究了董事通过董事会网络获取信息的优势是否提升企业预测准确性，发现高连接度的董事能显著改善管理层盈利预测，其建议作用补充了传统监督角色。
ABSTRACT I examine whether directors' superior access to information through their board network improves the accuracy of firms' forecasting. Managers may benefit from well-connected directors (i.e., board centrality) as they may have limited insight into market developments or decision-making processes of other firms beyond knowledge specific to their firm. Employing a sample of U.S.-listed companies, I separately examine the effect of within-firm variation in direct and indirect board connections on management earnings forecast accuracy. The study contributes by showing that higher-degree connections can have an economically significant effect on the accuracy of management forecasts, regardless of firms' board interlocks. Further analyses point toward well-connected directors' ability to provide managers with valuable advice in a forecasting context, which complements directors' more extensively studied role in preventing managerial expropriation. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G3; L14; M41.