Judge Effects, Case Characteristics, and Plea Bargaining
研究利用案件随机分配给法官的方式，分析法官严厉程度如何随定罪严重性变化，发现案件严重性是辩诉交易的内生结果，且严厉法官的案件更少达成辩诉交易。
A growing literature uses random assignment of cases to judges to examine criminal sentencing. To extend this line of work, we directly examine how judicial “harshness” varies with the seriousness of criminal conviction. Using a model that respects the mix of cases and the noise produced by small caseloads, we find that case severity is best viewed as an endogenous outcome of bargaining. We also find that harsher judges have a higher share of cases failing to reach a plea bargain, but perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence that large jumps in expected incarceration lead to differential plea bargain outcomes.