Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis
利用意大利银行与企业关系数据，研究发现资本不足的银行减少对健康企业的信贷，却继续向僵尸企业放贷，但此举在衰退期缓解了供应链中断和负面需求溢出。
Abstract Using data on bank-firm relationships in Italy during the Eurozone financial crisis, we show that: (i) compared to healthy banks, under-capitalised banks cut credit to healthy but not to zombie firms and are more likely to prolong a credit relationship with a zombie; (ii) in area sectors with more low-capital banks, zombies are more likely to survive; (iii) bank under-capitalisation does not hurt the growth rate of healthy firms. We provide evidence that extending credit to the weakest firms during the recession mitigated the disruption of supply chains and adverse local demand externalities.