Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
研究了如何设计权利结构来实施社会选择规则，使得在每种偏好下，博弈的最大一致集与规则选中的结果集一致。在有转移支付时，所有Maskin单调的规则都可实施，且核心均衡的可实施类不受远见推理影响。
The designer's exercise consists of designing a rights structure that formalizes the idea of power distribution in society. A solution is implementable in largest consistent set by a rights structure if there exists a rights structure such that for each preference profile, the largest consistent set of the game played by agents coincides with the set of outcomes that the solution would select for it. In a setting with transfers, every Maskin monotonic solution is implementable. This finding implies that the class of implementable solutions in core equilibria is unaltered by farsighted reasoning.