Asymmetric Timing of Gain and Loss Recognition and Insider Trading Profitability
研究发现公司财务报告中的不对称及时损失确认会降低内幕交易的盈利性，主要通过股票卖出、价格变动和非例行交易体现，表明该机制能减少管理者通过内幕交易从投资者获取租金的能力。
We provide evidence that the profitability of corporate insiders’ trading decreases in the degree of asymmetric timely loss recognition (TLR) of their firms’ financial reporting. Consistent with TLR reducing insiders’ information advantage over outside shareholders regarding future negative news about the firm, we find that reduced insider trading profitability is mainly driven by (a) stock sales, as opposed to purchases; (b) the price change component of trading, as opposed to its volume; and (c) insiders’ nonroutine trades, as opposed to less information driven routine trades. Although CEOs/CFOs are more likely to influence TLR, the effect is more pronounced for non-CEO and non-CFO insiders, inconsistent with reverse causality. Overall, our findings suggest that TLR reduces managers’ ability to extract rents from investors via insider trading.