Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas
通过实验研究公共品环境中不确定回报下的私人信息与沟通，发现廉价谈话基本诚实且提升效率，但夸大激励增强会降低诚实度和沟通收益。
We experimentally examine private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a common-value public goods game in which the return to contribution is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals correlated with the return and send cheap talk messages to one another. There are social gains from truthfulness, but a private incentive to exaggerate. We compare treatments with and without cheap talk, finding that communication is largely truthful and increases efficiency. In further treatments, we increase the incentive to exaggerate and find reduced truthfulness and smaller gains from communication.