Court performance and citizen attitudes toward fighting corruption
基于南非和突尼斯低收入地区的调查实验，研究法院在腐败案件中的公正性和效率如何通过制度渠道和公民渠道影响公民的反腐败态度。
Abstract This article investigates the relationship between court performance and citizen attitudes toward corruption. We develop a framework inspired by signaling theory that focuses on the need for institutional actors to send credible signals about their commitment against corruption if they seek to engage citizens. We suggest two channels that link court signals to citizen attitudes, an “institutional channel” linking signals to trust in courts and attitudes about state‐driven anti‐corruption measures and a “citizen channel” linking signals to citizen efficacy and norms about bribe paying. We investigate these channels with a survey experiment about a fictional court case in low income areas in South Africa and Tunisia. We find evidence that impartiality and efficiency by courts in corruption cases activate the institutional channel. Our findings suggest that courts can play an important role in the fight against corruption, not just by acting as deterrents but by affecting citizen attitudes toward corruption.