Low-carbon technology transfer between rival firms under cap-and-trade policies
研究了限额与交易政策下两家竞争制造商之间的低碳技术转移，分析了不同许可安排对经济、环境和社会福利的影响，发现企业间权力关系是决定最优合同的关键因素。
We investigate the effects of low-carbon technology transfer between two rival manufacturers on their economic, environmental, and social welfare performance under a cap-and-trade policy. We model alternative licensing arrangements of technology transfer and evaluate the model performance from the perspectives of different stakeholders, including manufacturers, customers, and policy makers. Our findings show that the contractual choice on low-carbon technology licensing is dependent on the trade-off between the benefits gained from the licensing of technology and the consequential losses incurred from competition with a strengthened competitor, which is influenced by a combination of factors, including internal technological abilities, the interfirm power relationship, external market competition, and the carbon emission control policy. Among them, the interfirm power relationship is most influential in determining the optimal contractual decision. In addition, we extend the analysis of technology licensing strategies to different carbon emissions caps with additional cost incurred from purchasing emission allowances through auction, and a two-period model considering emissions cap reduction, respectively. Finally, our analyses show it is critical for policy makers to develop appropriate emissions control policies to promote the agenda of a sustainable, low-carbon economy.