Fees, Reputation, and Information Production in the Credit Rating Industry
比较了信用评级机构在仅对有利评级收费与预先收费两种模式下的信息获取激励，发现或有费用在道德风险下能提供更强的动态激励并可能提高社会福利。
We compare a credit rating agency’s incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid up-front, i.e., irrespective of the ratings assigned. We show that, in the presence of moral hazard, contingent fees provide stronger dynamic incentives to acquire information than up-front fees and may induce higher social welfare. When the fee structure is chosen by the agency, contingent fees arise as an equilibrium outcome, in line with the way the market for credit rating actually works.