Unbundling the effects of host-country institutions on foreign subsidiary survival: A case for subsidiary heterogeneity
研究将东道国制度分解为契约制度和产权制度，发现弱契约制度对市场寻求型子公司生存更不利，而弱产权制度对资源寻求型子公司生存更不利，基于日本在46个国家的子公司数据验证。
This study seeks to advance a fine-grained understanding of the relationship between host-country institutions and foreign subsidiary survival by unbundling institutions into contracting and property rights institutions as well as engaging subsidiary-level heterogeneity. We argue that the adverse effects of weak contracting institutions are stronger for market-seeking subsidiaries. In contrast, we contend that weak property rights institutions are more detrimental to the survival of resource-seeking subsidiaries. Data from a longitudinal, paired-sample design of Japanese foreign subsidiaries operating across 46 countries provide support for these arguments. The results underscore the need to better understand institutional diversity as well as subsidiary heterogeneity.