Political ideology in M&A
研究发现美国上市公司并购中，收购方与目标方政治倾向相似时，收购方公告期超额收益显著更差，支付溢价更低，但管理层奖金更高，表明政治匹配的并购损害股东价值。
Abstract We study the effect of shared political identity between acquirers and targets on merger outcomes. In a sample of public US mergers, we find that targets are more likely to merge with firms of similar political orientation. We document that acquirers in politically matched mergers experience significantly worse cumulative abnormal returns around the merger announcement, compared to their non‐politically matched counterparts. Acquirers in those mergers pay lower takeover premiums, experience worse post‐merger operating performance, retain more from the target management, and receive larger bonuses. Our results indicate that politically matched mergers create less value to shareholders.