Understanding Disparities in Punishment: Regulator Preferences and Expertise
量化了环境规制执法中裁量权的收益，发现惩罚差异主要源于排污者合规成本差异而非监管者偏好，取消裁量权会提高执法成本并降低高社会危害排污者的合规性。
This paper quantifies the benefits of discretion in the enforcement of environmental regulations. We identify and estimate a structural model of regulator-discharger interactions, exploiting an increase in the enforcement stringency of water pollution regulations in California. Our estimates indicate that most of the heterogeneity in punishments for observably similar violations is due to heterogeneity in discharger compliance costs rather than heterogeneity in regulator preferences. We find that removing the discretion of regulators to tailor punishments to discharger attributes would raise enforcement costs and decrease compliance by dischargers with high social harms of violations.