The Deterrent Effect of Insider Trading Enforcement Actions
研究美国证券交易委员会（SEC）对内幕交易的执法行动如何影响其他公司内幕人士的交易行为，发现执法行动能显著降低内幕人士的异常交易利润，且威慑效果在同行被定罪时更强。
ABSTRACT We analyze whether exposure to an SEC insider trading enforcement action affects how insiders trade. We find that following an insider trading enforcement action at one firm, exposed insiders earn significantly lower abnormal profits from their trades at other firms compared to non-exposed insiders. The deterrent effect is stronger when a fellow insider is convicted, and is similarly significant both pre- and post-SOX. Following the enforcement event, exposed insiders do not trade less frequently, but do trade significantly fewer shares per trade. Insiders who have witnessed an enforcement action have a lower probability for future conviction than their unexposed peers. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G14; G40; K42.