Lump‐Sum Payments and Retail Services: A Relational Contracting Perspective*
研究了制造商如何通过重复互动和一次性支付激励零售商提供客户服务，发现即使零售商非常缺乏耐心，这种支付也能维持最优服务水平，并指出禁止反向一次性支付可能损害消费者福利。
How should manufacturers motivate their retailers to provide customer services? The vertical restraints literature tells us that retail competition distorts service incentives in the short run. We consider how repeated interaction mitigates this problem, and particularly how a manufacturer can provide service incentives with discretionary lump‐sum payments. We find that these payments may allow the manufacturer to sustain optimal service levels even if retailers are very impatient. We also show that banning reverse lump‐sum payments may deprive consumers of the chance to enjoy high‐quality services, and thereby reduce their welfare.