Contractual Restrictions and Debt Traps
研究了非正规借贷中利率和投资限制的谈判如何导致内生债务陷阱，解释了小额信贷对贫困借款人效果有限但对较大企业影响显著的现象。
Abstract Microcredit and other forms of small-scale finance have failed to catalyze entrepreneurship in developing countries. In these credit markets, borrowers and lenders often bargain over not only the interest rate but also implicit restrictions on types of investment. We build a dynamic model of informal lending and show this may lead to endogenous debt traps. Lenders constrain business growth for poor borrowers, yet richer borrowers may grow their businesses faster than they could have without credit. The theory offers nuanced comparative statics and rationalizes the low average impact and low demand of microfinance, despite its high impact on larger businesses.