A multiple agency view of venture capital investment duration: The roles of institutions, foreignness, and alliances
研究了风险投资公司如何受投资者、被投企业、共同投资者等多重关系影响投资退出时机，发现经验不足、制度环境差或外资身份会加速退出，而共同投资在发达经济体中能增加耐心，但在新兴经济体中无效。
Abstract Research Summary Venture capital firms (VCs) must simultaneously manage a range of relationships with investors, investees, prospective buyers, and co‐investors who frequently exert divergent influences on when investments should be exited. The greater weight of one particular relationship can lead a VC to exit an investment earlier than would maximize returns for that investment. In this study, we utilize a global sample to examine how VC firms' investment duration decisions are shaped by firm‐specific and environmental factors. Our findings suggest that VCs are less patient and exit faster when they have less experience, invest in more institutionally challenged host countries, or are foreign and invested in an emerging economy. Importantly, while co‐investing with other VCs increases patience in advanced economies, this effect disappears in emerging economies. Managerial Summary Agency theory explains why firms commonly capitalize on information advantages created by conditions of uncertainty to prioritize their own private interests over those shared with partners. This article introduces a framework, based on multiple agency theory, to examine the factors shaping the duration of venture capital firms' investments. Our findings, based on a sample of deals across 33 countries, suggest greater patience when host country market institutions are more advanced and venture capitalists themselves have more experience. In emerging economies only, we find that patience is increased by being local or from a foreign country with similarly challenging institutions. Importantly, while co‐investing with other venture capitalists increases patience in advanced economies, this effect disappears in emerging economies.