Do Corporate Disclosures Constrain Strategic Analyst Behavior?
研究发现，当投资者获取强制披露信息的及时性和成本因随机冲击而变化时，分析师会减少覆盖、发布更不乐观但更准确、更不大胆且信息量更少的预测，表明强制披露可替代分析师的信息生产。
Abstract We show that analyst behavior changes in response to a randomly assigned shock that exogenously varies the timeliness and cost of accessing mandatory disclosures in the cross-section of investors: analysts reduce coverage and issue less optimistic, more accurate, less bold, and less informative forecasts. Our evidence indicates that analysts reduce a strategic component of their behavior: the changes are stronger among analysts with more strategic incentives like affiliated or retail-focused analysts. We conclude that mandatory disclosure can substitute for analyst information production, which is constrained by investors’ ability to verify forecasts using corporate filings. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.