Why do managers disclose risks accurately? Textual analysis, disclosures, and risk exposures
提出了一个经济模型，证明在满足特定条件时，管理者会准确披露风险，并给最关键的风险更多篇幅。该模型适用于SEC监管环境，为使用文本分析衡量企业风险暴露提供了理论基础。
I provide an economic model that justifies using bag-of-words, topic modeling, and machine learning techniques to measure firms’ risk exposures using the percentage they allocate to each risk in their financial statements. The model provides a theoretical set of sufficient conditions under minimal assumptions that make managers optimally disclose risk accurately and give more space to the most critical risks. I document that the SEC Regulation satisfies this set of sufficient theoretical conditions and induces rational managers to disclose risks truthfully.