Public Pensions and Private Savings
利用丹麦提高养老金领取年龄的改革，发现延迟领取导致就业延长，进而增加个人和雇主资助退休账户的储蓄，惯性机制和企业默认缴费率政策起关键作用。
How does the provision of public pension benefits impact private savings? We answer this question in the context of a Danish reform that increased social security eligibility ages. Using administrative data and a regression discontinuity design, we identify the causal effects of the policy on savings throughout the financial portfolio. We find increases in contributions to personal and employer-sponsored retirement accounts when delayed benefit eligibility induces extended employment. We argue that inertia—the continuation of previous savings behaviors—is a key mechanism, and we highlight how firm default contribution rate policies can mediate savings responses to social security reform.