Securities-Based Crowdfunding by Startups: Does Auditor Attestation Matter?
研究了在信息不对称高、审计要求弱的环境下，初创企业通过众筹融资时，审计师审查（而非审计）对融资成功率和金额的正面影响，尤其自愿审查的信号作用。
ABSTRACT We examine financing outcomes for small businesses seeking to sell public securities in a setting characterized by high information asymmetry, weak requirements for auditor participation, and a complete absence of Big N auditors. Issuers that raise capital from small, unsophisticated investors through crowdfunding, under the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation Crowdfunding (RegCF), often need no auditor attestation or need only weak attestation in the form of reviews, not audits, of their financial statements. We find that auditor reviews are positively associated with both the probability of crowdfunding success and the total amount raised. Further, we compare outcomes for issuers that procure auditor reviews voluntarily and mandatorily, and document that issuers with voluntary reviews have better outcomes. We conjecture that for issuers that voluntarily procure reviews, the reviews serve as signals of high future prospects. Finally, the positive effect of reviews is concentrated in PCAOB-registered auditors. JEL Classifications: G18; M41; M42; M48.