On Market Concentration and Disclosure
本文在古诺竞争模型中为披露成本提供了微观基础，发现当市场竞争充分时，模型可简化为标准自愿披露博弈，且专有成本随竞争者数量、产品替代度、不确定性和生产成本增加而上升。
ABSTRACT Verrecchia (1983, 1990) introduced the proprietary cost hypothesis in which exogenous disclosure costs are a reduced-form interpretation of lost competitive advantage in product markets. We develop a micro-foundation for this disclosure cost in a Cournot game and explicitly derive the cost as a function of market structure. When the market is sufficiently competitive, this model has a reduced-form representation similar to a standard voluntary disclosure game with a partial disclosure equilibrium. Proprietary costs are increasing in the number of competitors, the degree of product substitution, overall uncertainty, and production costs. The analysis also offers new empirical predictions on the interaction between disclosure choice, managerial horizon, and entry. JEL Classifications: D82; L13; L50; M23; M4.