Implementing Project-Based Alliances: Three Paradoxes of Brokerage
研究发现，处于更高中介位置的组织虽能获得更多资本和分销渠道，从而实施更多联盟项目并存活更久，但这些项目平均表现更差，且与低中介伙伴结盟反而更好。
We theorize that organizations with higher brokerage positions (which we call brokers) benefit from access to capital and distribution that, paradoxically, causes them to implement poorer projects but to survive longer. Whereas prior research proposes that such organizations implement alliance projects because of their superior quality, we argue that they can do so despite project quality, because they have better access to capital and distribution. This access subjects their ventures to fewer implementation hurdles. As a result, there emerge three paradoxes and associated hypotheses: (a) brokers are able to implement more alliance projects, but their projects will perform on average more poorly; (b) brokers will tend to ally with other brokers but will do better when they ally with those having lower brokerage positions; and (c) despite the poorer performance of alliance projects, brokers will experience fewer risks and be less likely to exit the business. Paradoxically, brokerage makes organizations perform worse in each alliance but benefit from longer-term sustainability. In a study of 2,694 movie production companies in the Hollywood film industry from 1994 to 2009, we find considerable support for our hypotheses and develop a novel perspective on brokerage.