When Shareholders Disagree: Trading after Shareholder Meetings
研究股东大会后交易如何改变股东结构，发现共同基金在投票结果与自身意见相左时会减持，且交易量在会后四周内持续高位，支持意见分歧模型。
Abstract This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks on the meeting date, and remains high up to four weeks after shareholder meetings. The results support models based on differences of opinion that predict that shareholders’ beliefs may diverge more after observing voting outcomes. Hence, trading after meetings creates a more homogeneous shareholder base, which has important implications for corporate governance.