DISPUTE SETTLEMENT WITH SECOND‐ORDER UNCERTAINTY
研究二阶不确定性（即关于对方信念的不确定性）如何影响庭前争端谈判的效率，发现私人信号能扩大均衡策略集从而提升效率，而公开信号则无效。
Abstract The literature on pretrial dispute settlement has focused on the effect of first‐order uncertainty on bargaining, while assuming common knowledge about higher‐order beliefs. We study the effect of higher‐order uncertainty and show that the existence of such uncertainty improves the efficiency of settlement bargaining by expanding the set of strategies implementable in the equilibrium. We introduce uncertainty about higher‐order beliefs by assuming that one player privately observes an imperfect signal of the other player's type. We show that such signals could improve the efficiency only if they are privately observed: The signal's informational value disappears if it is publicly observable.