CEOs’ Regulatory Focus and Risk-Taking When Firms Perform Below and Above the Bar
研究CEO的调节焦点（促进型与预防型）如何影响企业在绩效低于或高于目标时的风险承担行为，发现两种焦点类型对风险承担的影响方向相反。
Both upper echelons theory and the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) have made important contributions to our understanding of the drivers of managerial risk-taking. Yet, how the individual- and organizational-level mechanisms espoused by these theories act in concert to determine risk-taking is not well understood. In this paper, we draw on regulatory focus theory as a fulcrum to bridge these two levels of analyses and integrate insights from both theoretical traditions. Consistent with the BTOF, we argue that promotion-focused CEOs engage in increased (decreased) risk-taking under conditions of performance below (above) aspirations. In contrast to the predictions of the BTOF, however, we predict that prevention-focused CEOs engage in increased (decreased) risk-taking under conditions of performance above (below) aspirations. We find support for these arguments in a large sample of CEOs from publicly listed U.S. firms and discuss the implications of our findings for both theory and practice.