Under/Over‐Investment and Early Renegotiation in Public‐Private Partnerships*
研究了公私合作项目中，政府如何设计合同以应对建设期投资不足或过度问题，发现当道德风险严重或中途违约激励强时，允许建设期重新谈判的合同能激励更多投资。
A public‐private partnership requires specialized expertise during construction of an infrastructure. Construction completion is costlier if the firm invests more upfront and if the government replaces the firm beforehand; more investment makes the operating cost more likely to be low. With a renegotiation‐proof contract, the government lessens moral hazard, unless this is severe or the incentives to renege in mid‐construction are strong. In these cases, it is less costly to motivate the parties to execute, in operation, a contract that was renegotiated in mid‐construction. Thus, the government offers a contract which leads to renegotiation in mid‐construction to secure more investment.