Precision of Public Information Disclosures, Banks' Stability, and Welfare
研究银行资产质量信息披露精度对融资成本、风险承担及社会福利的影响，发现信息越精确越鼓励银行冒险，最大稳定性出现在不透明环境。
Abstract Consider a bank which chooses an asset portfolio and then, upon the public disclosure of the results of a review of its quality, raises funds by offering a repayment promise. We show that increasing the precision of information about the quality of the bank's assets lowers the cost of funding of a sound bank and encourages it to take risk. Maximum stability is reached in an opaque environment. Maximum surplus is reached in an opaque (transparent) environment when the social costs of bank failure are large (small). We examine how these conclusions change under alternative information and contractual conditions.