A Theory of Claim Resolution
研究委托人如何根据代理人对索赔的解决来决定是否采纳其建议，分析了双方对事实权重或证据阈值存在分歧时的均衡特征，发现委托人更偏好过度重视局部事实的代理人。
Abstract We study claim resolution. A claim consists of a global fact and a local fact. The global fact is observed by the principal and the agent. The local fact is observed by the agent alone. The agent resolves the claim; the principal decides whether the agent is more likely wrong or right. The principal and agent can disagree about the weight to accord each fact or the overall evidence threshold. The agent cares whether the principal follows or ignores her advice. We characterize how the equilibrium varies with the nature of disagreement. Despite lacking commitment power, we find that the principal grants the agent decision-making authority over an interval of global facts. Further, we find that the principal can better motivate an agent who excessively weights the local fact than an agent who excessively weights the global fact. The principal strictly prefers the former to the latter even though either would make the same number of errors if granted complete autonomy.