Hospital competition and quality for non‐emergency patients in the English NHS
研究了英国一项放松患者选择医院限制的改革对三种非急诊治疗质量的影响，发现面临更多竞争对手的公立医院降低了质量、增加了等待时间并缩短了住院时间。
Abstract We investigate the effect on the quality of three high‐volume non‐emergency treatments of a reform that relaxed restrictions on patient choice of hospital. We employ a quasi difference‐in‐difference strategy and use control functions allowing for patient selection into providers correlated with unobserved morbidity. Public hospitals facing more rivals reduced quality, increased waiting times, and reduced length of stay for hip and knee replacements. This is likely due to regulated prices implying larger losses on these treatments compared to coronary artery bypass grafts, where no effects were found. Our findings are robust to estimation methods and competition measures, allowing for private providers’ entry.