Financial Hedging, Corporate Cash Policy, and the Value of Cash
研究美国上市公司使用金融衍生品对冲风险如何影响现金持有量和现金价值，发现对冲公司现金储备更少但现金价值更高，且对冲能提升投资效率，对融资受限、信息不对称严重、治理薄弱的企业效果更明显。
Abstract We study the implications of financial hedging for corporate cash policy and the value of cash holdings. Using a web crawler program to collect data on the use of financial derivatives between 1993 and 2016, we find that US public firms with financial hedging programs have smaller cash reserves but a higher value of cash than firms without hedging contracts in place. Our empirical results are robust when controlling for potential endogeneity issues, corporate governance, cash regimes and alternative measures of cash holdings. Further, we find that financial hedging not only increases the investment sensitivity to internal cash, but also has a positive effect on investment efficiency. The positive effect of financial hedging on the value of cash is more pronounced for firms with more financial constraints, higher information asymmetry and weaker corporate governance. Collectively, our paper highlights the importance of corporate cash policy as a channel through which financial risk management increases firm value.