Financial misconduct and employee mistreatment: Evidence from wage theft
研究发现，当企业刚好达到或超过盈利目标时，以及高管对工资盗窃的个人责任降低时，工资盗窃更常见；工资盗窃先于财务不当行为，但一旦被发现，企业更可能转向财务不当行为。
Abstract I examine the relation between firms’ financial conduct and wage theft. Wage theft represents the single largest form of theft committed in the United States and primarily affects firms’ most vulnerable employees. I show that wage theft is more prevalent (i) when firms just meet or beat earnings targets and (ii) when executives’ personal liability for wage theft decreases. Wage theft precedes financial misconduct while the theft is undetected, but once firms are caught engaging in wage theft they are more likely to shift to engaging in financial misconduct. My findings highlight an economically meaningful yet previously undocumented way in which firms’ financial incentives relate to employee treatment.