Lawyer Expertise and Contract Design—Evidence from M&A Negotiations
研究发现，在并购合同谈判中，律师相对对手的专长越高，越能为客户争取到更有利的风险分配和目标价格，且高专长律师通过缩短谈判时间节约交易成本，解释了律所收费差异和排名的作用。
Abstract We argue that the relative expertise of contracting parties strongly affects contractual outcomes. Using unique data on company acquisition contracts, we document that lawyers with higher expertise relative to their counterparties negotiate better risk allocation for their clients and more favourable target prices. The benefits of high expertise outweigh its costs, largely because high-expertise lawyers economise on transaction costs by shortening negotiation times. Our findings suggest a need for explicit modelling of contracting skills, and they help explain heterogeneity in legal fees across law firms and the role of league tables of law firms.