Asset‐Level Transparency and the (E)valuation of Asset‐Backed Securities
研究了美国SEC的Reg AB II法规要求发行人披露资产层面信用风险属性后，如何影响投资者和评级机构对资产支持证券的估值，发现披露提高了初始收益率和评级对资产表现的预测能力，并降低了收益率。
ABSTRACT As of November 2016, SEC Regulation (“Reg”) AB II requires issuers of certain types of asset‐backed securities (“ABS”) to disclose the credit‐risk attributes of each asset in the underlying pool, a substantial expansion of prior disclosure requirements. We examine how ABS issuers’ asset‐level disclosures under Reg AB II affect the (e)valuation of ABS by investors and credit rating agencies. Using difference‐in‐differences models that compare affected and unaffected types of ABS, we find that these disclosures improve the ability of initial ABS yields and credit ratings to predict the performance of the underlying assets. These results are concentrated in deals with above‐median risk layering in the underlying assets and complexity in the tranching of credit risk. We further find that asset‐level disclosures are associated with lower yields. Lastly, we provide evidence that most prospective ABS investors download asset‐level information during the price formation period prior to ABS issuance.