Technical Note—Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency
研究了共同代理模型中，存在一种可多项式时间识别的合同，能保证所有委托人的诚实、福利最大化以及有限责任和个体理性，并设计了相应的支付方案。
The “common agency” model, introduced by Bernheim and Whinston in 1986 combines the fundamental challenge of the principal–agent model with the challenges of coordinating multiple principals. In “Incomplete information VCG contracts for common agency,” Alon, Talgam-Cohen, Lavi, and Shamash show that the class of common agency settings for which there exists a contract that guarantees truthfulness of all principals, welfare maximization, and the two standard properties from contract theory—limited liability for the agent and individual rationality for the principals—is identifiable by a polynomial-time algorithm. Furthermore, for these settings, the authors design a polynomial-time computable contract: given valuation reports from the principals, it returns, if possible for the setting, a payment scheme for the agent that constitutes a contract with all desired properties.