How Social Norms and Social Identification Constrain Aggressive Reporting Behavior
通过三个实验，研究了报告标准的来源（谁制定）和类型（描述性还是指令性）如何共同影响财务经理的合规行为，发现对标准制定者的认同会抑制指令性标准下的激进报告，但对描述性标准无效甚至反向。
ABSTRACT This study examines how the source and nature of reporting standards jointly influence compliance with those standards. More specifically, I examine how decision makers' identification with the source of the standards moderates compliance with different types of standards. Type refers to whether the accounting standard is descriptive or injunctive (i.e., prescriptive). Source refers to the entity promulgating the accounting standards. I conduct three experiments in which participants face a direct trade-off between reporting aggressively to maximize their personal wealth and reporting conservatively to adhere to a standard. I find that identification with the source causes less aggressive reporting for an injunctive standard, but when a standard is descriptive, identification has no effect or an opposite effect. When identification with the source is low, descriptive standards tend to work well compared to injunctive standards. With injunctive standards, persuasive factors, such as identification, likely influence financial managers' aggressive reporting behavior.