The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring
研究发现，当公司依赖绩效信号和监督来评估经理能力时，更精确的信号反而可能增加监督的价值，两者形成互补关系，尤其在更换成本高时，信号精度提升会增强监督预期。
ABSTRACT A firm that must decide whether to retain or terminate a manager can rely on several sources of information to assess managerial ability. When it relies on a performance signal and monitoring, we show that a more informative signal can surprisingly increase the value of monitoring. Then, signal precision and monitoring are complements. This happens if a more precise information system makes some signals more negative indicators of managerial ability that still do not trigger termination. When the turnover cost is high enough and the manager is more entrenched after a positive performance, an increase in signal precision increases expected monitoring. In firms with a high turnover cost, a less informative signal is compounded by worse monitoring after a disappointing performance. This “bad corporate governance trap” makes it hard for these firms to eventually improve performance.