Information Sharing in a Competitive Microcredit Market
利用波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那小额信贷市场的合同数据，分析新信用登记系统对贷款违约、贷款发放和贷款条件的影响，发现信息共享降低了违约率，但导致贷款审批更严、额度更小、期限更短、利率更高。
Abstract We analyze contract‐level data on approved and rejected microloans to assess the impact of a new credit registry in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country with a competitive microcredit market. Our findings are threefold. First, information sharing reduces defaults, especially among new borrowers, and increases the return on lending. Second, lending tightens at the extensive margin as loan officers, using the new registry, reject more applications. Third, lending also tightens at the intensive margin: microloans become smaller, shorter, and more expensive. This affects both new borrowers and lending relationships established before the registry. In contrast, repeat borrowers whose lending relationship started after the registry introduction begin to benefit from larger loans at lower interest rates.