Liquidity Restrictions, Runs, and Central Bank Interventions: Evidence from Money Market Funds
研究发现2016年改革引入的赎回限制（如赎回门槛和流动性费用）在新冠危机期间反而加剧了优质货币市场基金的挤兑，而美联储的流动性便利（MMLF）成功稳定了市场。
Abstract Liquidity restrictions on investors, like the redemption gates and liquidity fees introduced in the 2016 money market fund (MMF) reform, are meant to improve financial stability. However, we find evidence that such liquidity restrictions exacerbated the run on prime MMFs during the COVID-19 crisis. Our results indicate that gates and fees could generate strategic complementarities among investors in crisis times. Severe outflows from prime MMFs led the Federal Reserve to intervene with the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF). Using MMLF microdata, we show how the provision of “liquidity of last resort” stabilized prime funds.