Golden Handcuffs and Corporate Innovation: Evidence from Defined Benefit Pension Plans
研究发现，固定收益养老金价值越高的企业，专利数量和引用越多；养老金冻结会抑制创新，而养老金赤字因内部债务性质阻碍创新。
Abstract This study examines the relation between employee incentives and corporate innovation. We find that firms with a higher defined benefit (DB) pension value secure more patents and patent citations. We further show that pension freezes, which stop the accumulation of pension obligations, negatively affect innovation outcomes. The value of a DB plan enhances innovation by motivating employees to produce higher output and through loyalty. However, pension deficits impede innovation because of the nature of inside debt. Overall, our findings call for a fresh look at pensions by policy makers and practitioners, given the historic shift away from DB plans..