Financial consequences of reputational damage: Evidence from government economic incentives
利用2000至2018年的诉讼、欺诈和网络攻击数据衡量声誉变化，发现声誉受损的企业获得更少的政府补贴和大型交易，且补贴仅对未受损企业提升价值。
Abstract We investigate and quantify the financial consequences of corporate reputation by using manually assembled litigation, fraud, and cyberattack data from 2000 to 2018 to measure reputation changes following events that are often tied to public scrutiny. We examine the role of reputation in government subsidy awards and find reputational damage is linked to lower subsidies and Mega Deals, particularly tax‐related and state government awards. Moreover, subsidies only relate to higher firm value for firms without reputational damage. Our findings suggest that reputation is an important determinant of relatively opaque economic incentive awards and that reputational damage constrains the benefits thereof.