Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade‐Offs and Outcomes
估计了美联储银行监管人员工作时间的资源分配结构模型，发现监管显著影响银行风险，且存在规模经济；监管者偏好大银行，尤其在2008年后资源重新分配增加了整体银行风险。
ABSTRACT We estimate a structural model of resource allocation on work hours of Federal Reserve bank supervisors to disentangle how supervisory technology, preferences, and resource constraints impact bank outcomes. We find a significant effect of supervision on bank risk and large technological scale economies with respect to bank size. Consistent with macroprudential objectives, revealed supervisory preferences disproportionately weight larger banks, especially post‐2008 when a resource reallocation to larger banks increased risk on average across all banks. Shadow cost estimates show tight resources around the financial crisis and counterfactuals indicate that binding constraints have large effects on the distribution of bank outcomes.