Outside Opportunities, Managerial Risk Taking, and CEO Compensation
利用美国各州逐步采纳不可避免披露原则（IDD）这一准外生冲击，研究了外部就业机会限制如何影响CEO薪酬结构，发现IDD采纳后CEO财富对股票波动率的敏感性（vega）显著增加，且该效应在职业担忧更强、事前流动性更高及商业秘密更重要的CEO中更为明显。
ABSTRACT Exploiting the setting of staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) in U.S. state courts, we examine how quasi-exogenous restrictions of outside employment opportunities affect CEO compensation structure. The IDD adoption constrains executives' ability to work for competitors, which likely decreases CEOs' tendency to take risks by increasing the cost of job loss and reducing the reward to risk taking. We expect the board to respond by increasing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) to encourage risk taking. We find a significant increase in vega post-IDD adoption. The effect is stronger among CEOs with greater career concerns. The effect also increases with the ex ante CEO mobility and the importance of trade secrets, suggesting the board increases vega more when there is a greater reduction in CEO outside opportunities. Overall, we provide new evidence on how external labor market frictions affect the convexity of CEO compensation. JEL Classifications: G32; M12; J60.