Managing adverse selection: underinsurance versus underenrollment
研究了保险市场中逆向选择导致的不足额保险和参保不足问题，分析了风险调整和个人强制参保政策对两者的权衡影响，并基于加州ACA交易所数据量化了福利效应。
Abstract Adverse selection in insurance markets may lead some consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase insurance relative to the socially optimal level. I study whether common government policy interventions can mitigate both underinsurance and underenrollment due to adverse selection. I establish conditions under which there exists a tradeoff in addressing underinsurance and underenrollment. I then estimate a model of the California ACA insurance exchange using consumer‐level data to quantify the welfare impact of risk adjustment and the individual mandate. I find (1) risk adjustment reduces underinsurance, but reduces enrollment and (2) the mandate increases enrollment, but increases underinsurance.