Monopolistic competition with generalized additively separable preferences
研究了在对称广义可加可分偏好下，自由进入的垄断竞争均衡与社会规划者解，涵盖加性、同质、超越对数等偏好，分析了市场无效率与最优性，并提出了新的偏好设定及其在贸易和宏观经济学中的应用。
Abstract We study monopolistic competition equilibria with free entry and social planner solutions under symmetric generalized additively separable preferences, which encompass known cases such as additive, homothetic, translog and other preferences. This setting can jointly produce competition and selection effects of entry, incomplete pass-through of cost changes and pricing to market. We discuss the inefficiencies of the market equilibrium under Gorman-Pollak preferences and show its optimality under implicit constant elasticity of substitution preferences. We propose a new specification of generalized translated power preferences, and discuss applications to trade and macroeconomics.