The Conservation Multiplier
研究了控制可耗竭资源的政府面临开发或保护决策时，未来政府可能开发的微小概率如何对当前决策产生乘数效应，并分析了游说团体和捐助者如何利用这一乘数。
EvEvery government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a model of this situation and shows when a small probability that some future government will exploit has a multiplier effect on earlier decisions. The multiplier can be taken advantage of by a lobby paying for exploitation, or by a donor compensating for conservation. The analysis also uncovers when compensations are optimally offered to the president, the party in power, the general public, or to the lobby group.