Does the Threat of a PCAOB Inspection Mitigate US Institutional Investors' Home Bias?*
利用PCAOB国际检查计划的逐步引入，研究发现当外国在美上市公司的审计师面临PCAOB检查威胁时，美国机构投资者会增持这些公司的股权，从而缓解其本土偏好，尤其在缺乏严格本地审计监管的国家和重视会计透明度的活跃机构投资者中效果更显著。
ABSTRACT We exploit the staggered introduction of the PCAOB's international inspection program to examine the role that the stringency of public audit oversight plays in shaping US institutional investors' home bias. Analyzing a sample of foreign firms listed in the United States, we evaluate whether US institutional investors hold larger equity stakes in these firms—a longstanding issue that reflects investor portfolio decisions—if their auditors are exposed to the threat of a PCAOB inspection. In a differences‐in‐differences framework, we find that US‐listed foreign firms enjoy an increase in US institutional investors' equity positions after their auditors become subject to PCAOB inspection access. Cross‐sectional analysis implies that the benefit of the PCAOB inspection threat in mitigating US institutional investors' home bias is concentrated in foreign countries without a strict local audit oversight system; active US institutional investors that are known to value accounting transparency; and firms from countries that grant PCAOB access later (after the onset of its international inspection program in 2005). Our evidence suggests that foreign firms become better known in the capital markets under the PCAOB inspection program, which induces US institutional investors to acquire larger equity stakes in US‐listed foreign firms given the lower information asymmetry that ensues under the PCAOB inspection threat.